// Nostr backup: key derivation stability, event build/parse round-trips,
// tamper rejection, publish/fetch and restore against an in-memory relay
// (the transport is injected - no network), and the debounced publisher.

import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { bytesToHex } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
import type { NostrEvent } from 'nostr-tools/core';
import { finalizeEvent, getPublicKey } from 'nostr-tools/pure';
import { v2 as nip44v2 } from 'nostr-tools/nip44';
import { buildNoteUrl } from 'lnurlcash-kit';

import { deriveBearerAesKey, linkingPubKeyHex, saveLinkingKey } from './keys';
import {
  BACKUP_EVENT_KIND,
  backupPubkey,
  buildBackupEvent,
  buildBackupEvents,
  createBackupPublisher,
  deriveBackupKey,
  fetchBackup,
  parseBackupEvent,
  publishBackup,
  restoreFromNostr,
} from './nostrBackup';
import type { BackupPartPayload, BackupTransport } from './nostrBackup';
import {
  loadBearers,
  loadSettings,
  mergeBearers,
  persistBearer,
  persistSettings,
  readEncryptedBearers,
} from './storage';
import type { Bearer } from './types';
import { addTrustedMint, isMintUnconfirmed, readTrustedMints } from './trustedMints';
import { requiredValue, stubLocalStorage } from './test-utils';

const LINKING_KEY = new Uint8Array(32).fill(7);
const OTHER_KEY = new Uint8Array(32).fill(9);
const OWNER_ID = linkingPubKeyHex(LINKING_KEY);

const K1_A = 'aa'.repeat(32);
const K1_B = 'bb'.repeat(32);
const MINT_PUBKEY = 'ab'.repeat(33);

// never connected - the recording transport below stands in for the relays
const RELAYS = ['wss://relay-a.example', 'wss://relay-b.example'];

const bearerFixture = (overrides: Partial<Bearer> = {}): Bearer => ({
  id: 'fixture',
  url: buildNoteUrl('https://mint.example/w', K1_A, 21_000),
  callback: 'https://mint.example/w/cb',
  amount: 21_000,
  verified: true,
  createdAt: 1000,
  updatedAt: 1000,
  ...overrides,
});

// an in-memory relay set. It serves EVERY event it ever accepted, older
// addressable copies included - like a relay that never replaces - which
// is exactly the case fetchBackup's client-side latest-pick exists for
const createRecordingTransport = (): {
  transport: BackupTransport;
  events: NostrEvent[];
} => {
  const events: NostrEvent[] = [];
  const transport: BackupTransport = {
    publish: (_relays, event) => {
      events.push(event);
      return Promise.resolve();
    },
    fetch: (_relays, filter) =>
      Promise.resolve(
        events.filter(
          (e) =>
            (!filter.kinds || filter.kinds.includes(e.kind)) &&
            (!filter.authors || filter.authors.includes(e.pubkey)),
        ),
      ),
  };
  return { transport, events };
};

// flips the end of a base64 payload to different-but-valid characters
const tamperContent = (content: string): string =>
  content.slice(0, -4) + (content.endsWith('AAAA') ? 'BBBB' : 'AAAA');

beforeEach(() => {
  stubLocalStorage();
});

afterEach(() => {
  vi.useRealTimers();
});

describe('buildBackupEvent / parseBackupEvent', () => {
  const secretKey = deriveBackupKey(LINKING_KEY);

  const records = [
    // long unique sentinel id: a short id like 'r1' randomly appears in
    // base64 ciphertext (~17% for 700 chars), which flakes the no-plaintext
    // assertion below
    { id: 'record-id-plaintext-sentinel-7f3a', iv: '00'.repeat(12), ciphertext: 'ab'.repeat(40) },
  ];
  const notes = { bearers: records, nextByHost: { 'mint.example': 3 } };
  const mints = [{ server: 'mint.example', mintPubkey: MINT_PUBKEY, addedAt: 1000, locked: true }];
  const settings = { defaultMint: 'mint.example' };

  it('round-trips all three parts through build and parse', () => {
    const events = buildBackupEvents(secretKey, { notes, mints, settings }, 1000);
    expect(events).toHaveLength(3);
    expect(events.map((e) => e.kind)).toEqual([
      BACKUP_EVENT_KIND,
      BACKUP_EVENT_KIND,
      BACKUP_EVENT_KIND,
    ]);
    expect(events.map((e) => e.tags)).toEqual([
      [['d', 'notes']],
      [['d', 'mints']],
      [['d', 'settings']],
    ]);
    expect(events.every((e) => e.pubkey === backupPubkey(secretKey))).toBe(true);

    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, requiredValue(events[0]))).toEqual({
      part: 'notes',
      bearers: records,
      nextByHost: { 'mint.example': 3 },
    });
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, requiredValue(events[1]))).toEqual({
      part: 'mints',
      trustedMints: mints,
    });
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, requiredValue(events[2]))).toEqual({
      part: 'settings',
      settings,
    });
  });

  it('leaves no plaintext in the payload', () => {
    const event = buildBackupEvent(secretKey, 'notes', notes);
    expect(event.content).not.toContain('record-id-plaintext-sentinel-7f3a');
    expect(event.content).not.toContain('ciphertext');
  });

  it('builds events only for the parts present', () => {
    const events = buildBackupEvents(secretKey, { settings }, 1000);
    expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
    expect(requiredValue(events[0]).tags).toEqual([['d', 'settings']]);
  });

  it('rejects a payload encrypted for a different key', () => {
    const event = buildBackupEvent(secretKey, 'settings', settings);
    expect(parseBackupEvent(deriveBackupKey(OTHER_KEY), event)).toBeNull();
  });

  it('rejects the wrong kind', () => {
    const event = buildBackupEvent(secretKey, 'settings', settings);
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, { ...event, kind: 30079 })).toBeNull();
  });

  it('rejects an unknown d-tag', () => {
    const event = buildBackupEvent(secretKey, 'settings', settings);
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, { ...event, tags: [['d', 'secrets']] })).toBeNull();
  });

  it('rejects a modified ciphertext - the signature no longer matches', () => {
    const event = buildBackupEvent(secretKey, 'settings', settings);
    const tampered = { ...event, content: tamperContent(event.content) };
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, tampered)).toBeNull();
  });

  it('rejects an event signed by a different key', () => {
    const foreign = buildBackupEvent(deriveBackupKey(OTHER_KEY), 'settings', settings);
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, foreign)).toBeNull();
  });

  it('rejects a validly signed event whose payload is not a backup envelope', () => {
    // a same-key event of the right kind and d-tag, but its decrypted
    // content is not a version-1 envelope
    const conversationKey = nip44v2.utils.getConversationKey(secretKey, getPublicKey(secretKey));
    const event = finalizeEvent(
      {
        kind: BACKUP_EVENT_KIND,
        created_at: 1000,
        tags: [['d', 'settings']],
        content: nip44v2.encrypt(JSON.stringify({ version: 2, settings: {} }), conversationKey),
      },
      secretKey,
    );
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, event)).toBeNull();
  });

  it('rejects a legacy version-1 notes envelope and a v2 notes envelope without counters', () => {
    const conversationKey = nip44v2.utils.getConversationKey(secretKey, getPublicKey(secretKey));
    const build = (payload: unknown): NostrEvent =>
      finalizeEvent(
        {
          kind: BACKUP_EVENT_KIND,
          created_at: 1000,
          tags: [['d', 'notes']],
          content: nip44v2.encrypt(JSON.stringify(payload), conversationKey),
        },
        secretKey,
      );
    // v1 notes carried bare bearer arrays and no counters - pre-funds-document
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, build({ version: 1, bearers: records }))).toBeNull();
    expect(parseBackupEvent(secretKey, build({ version: 2, bearers: records }))).toBeNull();
    // a v2 envelope whose counters are malformed is rejected, not coerced
    expect(
      parseBackupEvent(secretKey, build({ version: 2, bearers: records, nextByHost: 'junk' })),
    ).toBeNull();
  });
});