// Passkey engine tests. The WebAuthn ceremony is faked by an injected // authenticator whose PRF output is HMAC-SHA256(credential secret, salt) - // the real extension's exact contract: deterministic per credential+salt, // unguessable without the authenticator. Everything except a real // authenticator's touch is covered here. import {beforeEach, describe, expect, it} from 'vitest' import {hmac} from '@noble/hashes/hmac.js' import {sha256} from '@noble/hashes/sha2.js' import {bytesToHex} from '@noble/hashes/utils.js' import type {CeremonyCredential, PasskeyCredentials} from './passkeys' import { derivePasskeyWrapKey, getPasskeyPrfOutput, hasPasskeySlots, migrateLegacyPasskeySlots, passkeySupported, readPasskeySlots, registerPasskey, removePasskey, rewrapAllSlots, unlockWithPasskey, unwrapLinkingKeyWithPrf, wrapLinkingKeyWithPrf, } from './passkeys' import { decryptRecord, decryptSavedLinkingKey, deriveBearerAesKey, ensureSavedKeyOwner, encryptRecord, linkingPubKeyHex, savedKeyOwnerId, saveLinkingKey, } from './keys' import {parseJsonObject, parseJsonObjectArray, stubLocalStorage} from './test-utils' const LINKING_KEY = new Uint8Array(32).fill(7) const OTHER_LINKING_KEY = new Uint8Array(32).fill(9) const PRF_OUTPUT = new Uint8Array(32).fill(3) const OTHER_PRF_OUTPUT = new Uint8Array(32).fill(4) const toBytes = (source: BufferSource): Uint8Array => source instanceof ArrayBuffer ? new Uint8Array(source) : new Uint8Array(source.buffer, source.byteOffset, source.byteLength) // Fake platform authenticator: holds credentials (id -> secret), evaluates // PRF as HMAC-SHA256(secret, salt). Flags emulate the authenticator quirks // found in the wild: PRF unsupported, results only on get, results never. class FakeAuthenticator implements PasskeyCredentials { // id typed Uint8Array: rawId must satisfy BufferSource private held = new Map; secret: Uint8Array}>() supportsPrf = true prfResultsOnCreate = true prfResultsOnGet = true createCalls = 0 getCalls = 0 create = async (options?: CredentialCreationOptions): Promise => { this.createCalls += 1 const salt = options?.publicKey?.extensions?.prf?.eval?.first const id = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)) const secret = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)) this.held.set(bytesToHex(id), {id, secret}) return { type: 'public-key', rawId: id, getClientExtensionResults: () => ({ prf: this.supportsPrf && salt ? { enabled: true, ...(this.prfResultsOnCreate ? {results: {first: this.prf(secret, salt)}} : {}), } : {}, }), } } // answers with the first allowed credential it holds, like a real // authenticator picking among allowCredentials; null when it holds none get = async (options?: CredentialRequestOptions): Promise => { this.getCalls += 1 const pk = options?.publicKey const allowed = (pk?.allowCredentials ?? []).map((d) => bytesToHex(toBytes(d.id))) const match = allowed.find((hex) => this.held.has(hex)) const held = match ? this.held.get(match) : undefined if (!held) return null const salt = pk?.extensions?.prf?.eval?.first return { type: 'public-key', rawId: held.id, getClientExtensionResults: () => ({ prf: salt && this.prfResultsOnGet ? {enabled: true, results: {first: this.prf(held.secret, salt)}} : {}, }), } } // simulates the passkey's secret changing underneath a slot (credential // re-created on the authenticator while the slot stayed behind) rotateSecret = (credentialId: string): void => { const held = this.held.get(credentialId) if (held) held.secret = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)) } private prf = (secret: Uint8Array, salt: BufferSource): Uint8Array => { // set into a fresh array: hmac returns Uint8Array, // which BufferSource rejects const out = new Uint8Array(32) out.set(hmac(sha256, secret, toBytes(salt))) return out } } const readRawSlots = (): Array> => parseJsonObjectArray(localStorage.getItem('sattle_passkey_slots') ?? '[]') const writeRawSlots = (slots: Array>): void => { localStorage.setItem('sattle_passkey_slots', JSON.stringify(slots)) } const removeSavedOwnerMarker = (): void => { const stored = parseJsonObject(localStorage.getItem('sattle_linking_key') ?? '{}') delete stored.ownerId delete stored.version localStorage.setItem('sattle_linking_key', JSON.stringify(stored)) } beforeEach(async () => { stubLocalStorage() await saveLinkingKey(LINKING_KEY) }) describe('pure wrap crypto', () => { it('round-trips a linking key through a PRF-derived wrap', async () => { const wrap = await wrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(PRF_OUTPUT, LINKING_KEY) const unwrapped = await unwrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(PRF_OUTPUT, wrap) expect(bytesToHex(unwrapped)).toBe(bytesToHex(LINKING_KEY)) }) it('rejects unwrap with a different PRF output', async () => { const wrap = await wrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(PRF_OUTPUT, LINKING_KEY) await expect(unwrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(OTHER_PRF_OUTPUT, wrap)).rejects.toThrow() }) it('rejects unwrap with a tampered HKDF salt', async () => { const wrap = await wrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(PRF_OUTPUT, LINKING_KEY) await expect( unwrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(PRF_OUTPUT, {...wrap, hkdfSalt: 'ab'.repeat(16)}), ).rejects.toThrow() }) it('rejects unwrap with a tampered ciphertext', async () => { const wrap = await wrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(PRF_OUTPUT, LINKING_KEY) const flipped = `${wrap.wrappedKey.slice(0, -2)}${wrap.wrappedKey.endsWith('00') ? '01' : '00'}` await expect( unwrapLinkingKeyWithPrf(PRF_OUTPUT, {...wrap, wrappedKey: flipped}), ).rejects.toThrow() }) it('derives wrap keys deterministically from the same PRF output and salt', async () => { const salt = new Uint8Array(16).fill(1) const a = await derivePasskeyWrapKey(PRF_OUTPUT, salt) const b = await derivePasskeyWrapKey(PRF_OUTPUT, salt) const record = await encryptRecord(a, {v: 1}) await expect(decryptRecord(b, record)).resolves.toEqual({v: 1}) }) })