import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { noteK1, noteSignature } from 'lnurlcash-kit';

import { ensureExactAmount } from './ops';
import { requiredValue } from './test-utils';
import {
  allocateOutputSecrets,
  makeBearer,
  mint,
  noteUrl,
  secret,
  signatureKeysFor,
} from './ops.testHarness';
import { fetchNoteInfo } from 'lnurlcash-kit';

// Landed split/merge outputs carry the mint's signature in their URL (sig
// param), and earn verified:true only when that signature checks against a
// trusted CURRENT or PREVIOUS key for the mint. Invalid, missing, or
// wrong-key signatures - and mints with no trusted keys at all - keep the
// staged outputs unverified; the money is tracked either way (the notes
// exist at the mint), only the offline-verifiable badge is withheld.
describe('landed mutation signature verification', () => {
  it('verifies a landed split against the current key and preserves its signature', async () => {
    const instance = await mint();
    const bearer = await makeBearer(instance, secret('a0'), 21_000);

    const result = await ensureExactAmount([bearer], 5_000, {
      onCarve: () => undefined,
      allocateOutputSecrets,
      mintSignatureKeys: signatureKeysFor(instance),
    });

    expect(result.note.verified).toBe(true);
    const signature = noteSignature(result.note.url);
    expect(signature).not.toBeNull();
    expect(noteSignature(requiredValue(result.change).url)).not.toBeNull();
    // change stays unverified (its true post-fee value is unknown until a
    // refresh) even though its signature is preserved
    expect(result.change?.verified).toBe(false);
  });

  it('verifies a landed merge against the current key and preserves its signature', async () => {
    const instance = await mint();
    const first = await makeBearer(instance, secret('a1'), 3_000);
    const second = await makeBearer(instance, secret('a2'), 4_000);

    const result = await ensureExactAmount([first, second], 7_000, {
      onCarve: () => undefined,
      allocateOutputSecrets,
      mintSignatureKeys: signatureKeysFor(instance),
    });

    expect(result.note.verified).toBe(true);
    expect(noteSignature(result.note.url)).not.toBeNull();
  });

  it('verifies against the previous key after the mint rotated its signing key', async () => {
    // the mint signs every output under its RETIRED key while advertising
    // the current one - exactly the rekey window a holder must tolerate
    const instance = await mint({
      previousPrivateKey: '22'.repeat(32),
      signWithPreviousKey: true,
    });
    const bearer = await makeBearer(instance, secret('a3'), 21_000);

    const result = await ensureExactAmount([bearer], 5_000, {
      onCarve: () => undefined,
      allocateOutputSecrets,
      mintSignatureKeys: signatureKeysFor(instance),
    });

    expect(instance.state.previousPubkeys).toHaveLength(1);
    expect(result.note.verified).toBe(true);
    expect(noteSignature(result.note.url)).not.toBeNull();
  });

  it('rejects verification when the previous key is not trusted', async () => {
    const instance = await mint({
      previousPrivateKey: '22'.repeat(32),
      signWithPreviousKey: true,
    });
    const bearer = await makeBearer(instance, secret('a4'), 21_000);

    const result = await ensureExactAmount([bearer], 5_000, {
      onCarve: () => undefined,
      allocateOutputSecrets,
      // only the current key is trusted - the signature under the retired
      // key must not verify
      mintSignatureKeys: () => [instance.state.pubkey],
    });

    expect(result.note.verified).toBe(false);
    // the note and its signature are still tracked, recoverable by refresh
    expect(noteSignature(result.note.url)).not.toBeNull();
    const partK1 = requiredValue(noteK1(result.note.url));
    expect(instance.state.noteState(partK1)).toBe('outstanding');
    expect(instance.state.noteState(secret('a4'))).toBe('burned');
  });

  it('keeps a wrong-key signature staged unverified', async () => {
    const instance = await mint();
    const bearer = await makeBearer(instance, secret('a5'), 21_000);
    const stranger = await mint({ privateKey: '33'.repeat(32) });

    const result = await ensureExactAmount([bearer], 5_000, {
      onCarve: () => undefined,
      allocateOutputSecrets,
      // the only trusted key on file belongs to a DIFFERENT mint
      mintSignatureKeys: () => [stranger.state.pubkey],
    });

    expect(result.note.verified).toBe(false);
    expect(noteSignature(result.note.url)).not.toBeNull();
    expect(instance.state.noteState(secret('a5'))).toBe('burned');
    expect(instance.state.noteState(requiredValue(noteK1(result.note.url)))).toBe('outstanding');
  });

  it('keeps a landed split unsigned by the mint staged unverified and consumed', async () => {
    const instance = await mint({ signatures: false });
    const k1 = secret('a6');
    const bearer = await makeBearer(instance, k1, 21_000);

    const result = await ensureExactAmount([bearer], 5_000, {
      onCarve: () => undefined,
      allocateOutputSecrets,
      mintSignatureKeys: signatureKeysFor(instance),
    });

    // the mutation landed (the kit refused the missing signature, the
    // rescue probe proved the burn): the inputs are retired, the staged
    // outputs are tracked at exactly their staged secrets, unverified
    expect(result.consumed.map((entry) => entry.id)).toEqual([bearer.id]);
    expect(result.note.verified).toBe(false);
    expect(noteSignature(result.note.url)).toBeNull();
    expect(instance.state.noteState(k1)).toBe('burned');
    const partK1 = requiredValue(noteK1(result.note.url));
    expect(instance.state.noteState(partK1)).toBe('outstanding');
    expect((await fetchNoteInfo(noteUrl(instance, partK1))).maxWithdrawable).toBe(5_000);
  });

  it('never verifies a landed mutation without any trusted keys on file', async () => {
    const instance = await mint();
    const bearer = await makeBearer(instance, secret('a7'), 21_000);

    const result = await ensureExactAmount([bearer], 5_000, {
      onCarve: () => undefined,
      allocateOutputSecrets,
      // no key source at all: nothing may be trusted blindly
    });

    expect(result.note.verified).toBe(false);
    expect(noteSignature(result.note.url)).not.toBeNull();
    expect(instance.state.noteState(requiredValue(noteK1(result.note.url)))).toBe('outstanding');
  });
});