mirror of
https://github.com/tompro/sattle.git
synced 2026-10-26 01:49:58 +00:00
fix(unlock): bind factors to wallet material
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
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import { bytesToHex, utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
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import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes, utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
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import {
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deriveWalletMaterial,
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serializeWalletMaterial,
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walletMaterialHash,
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type WalletMaterialV2,
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} from '@/lnurlcash/keys';
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import { walletMaterialOwnerId } from '@/lnurlcash/storage/storedSecret';
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@@ -50,6 +51,11 @@ const SEED =
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const OTHER_SEED = 'legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow';
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const MATERIAL = deriveWalletMaterial(SEED);
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const OTHER_MATERIAL = deriveWalletMaterial(OTHER_SEED);
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// same linking key (same owner) as MATERIAL, but a different, VALID cash root
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const ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL: WalletMaterialV2 = {
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...MATERIAL,
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cashRootHex: OTHER_MATERIAL.cashRootHex,
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};
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const WRAP_SECRET = new Uint8Array(32).fill(3);
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const WRAP_RECORD_KEY = 'sattle_biometric_wrap';
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const SECURE_SECRET_KEY = 'sattle-biometric-wrap-secret';
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@@ -90,6 +96,7 @@ const deriveFixtureWrapKey = async (
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const storePayload = async (
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plaintext: Uint8Array,
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pubkey: string,
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materialHash: string,
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secret = WRAP_SECRET,
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): Promise<void> => {
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const hkdfSalt = new Uint8Array(16).fill(4);
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@@ -106,6 +113,7 @@ const storePayload = async (
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iv: bytesToHex(iv),
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wrappedKey: bytesToHex(ciphertext),
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pubkey,
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materialHash,
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createdAt: 1,
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}),
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);
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@@ -115,7 +123,10 @@ const storePayload = async (
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const storeMaterialPayload = async (
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material: WalletMaterialV2,
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pubkey = walletMaterialOwnerId(material),
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): Promise<void> => storePayload(utf8ToBytes(serializeWalletMaterial(material)), pubkey);
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secret = WRAP_SECRET,
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materialHash = walletMaterialHash(material),
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): Promise<void> =>
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storePayload(utf8ToBytes(serializeWalletMaterial(material)), pubkey, materialHash, secret);
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks();
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@@ -194,7 +205,11 @@ describe('biometric wallet material', () => {
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])('returns no material for an authenticated %s and preserves state', async (_label, payload) => {
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// Given an authenticated non-canonical payload bound to the saved owner
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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await storePayload(payload, walletMaterialOwnerId(MATERIAL));
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await storePayload(
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payload,
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walletMaterialOwnerId(MATERIAL),
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walletMaterialHash(MATERIAL),
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);
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const before = persistedState();
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// When biometric unlock decrypts the payload
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@@ -266,7 +281,12 @@ describe('biometric wallet material', () => {
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localStorage.setItem('sattle_nwc_connections', 'legacy-nwc-residue');
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localStorage.setItem('sattle_passkey_slots', 'legacy-passkey-residue');
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localStorage.setItem('sattle_trusted_mints', 'legacy-trust-residue');
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await storeMaterialPayload(OTHER_MATERIAL, walletMaterialOwnerId(MATERIAL));
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await storeMaterialPayload(
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OTHER_MATERIAL,
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walletMaterialOwnerId(MATERIAL),
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WRAP_SECRET,
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walletMaterialHash(MATERIAL),
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);
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const before = persistedState();
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// When biometric unlock checks the decrypted linking-key owner
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@@ -278,6 +298,143 @@ describe('biometric wallet material', () => {
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});
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});
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describe('biometric exact-material commitment', () => {
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it('rejects same-owner altered-root enrollment before writing either biometric store', async () => {
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// Given one proven saved owner and well-formed material with only the cash root swapped
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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const before = persistedState();
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// When enrollment is attempted with the same-owner altered-root material
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const attempt = enableBiometricUnlock(ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL);
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// Then the exact-material commitment fails before native or local persistence changes
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('saved wallet material');
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expect(persistedState()).toEqual(before);
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expect(pluginMocks.secureSet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('rejects same-owner altered-root enrollment against encrypted saved material', async () => {
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// Given the saved material envelope is password-encrypted (no plaintext available)
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL, 'password');
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const before = persistedState();
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// When enrollment is attempted with the same-owner altered-root material
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const attempt = enableBiometricUnlock(ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL);
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// Then the hash commitment alone rejects it before either store changes
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('saved wallet material');
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expect(persistedState()).toEqual(before);
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expect(pluginMocks.secureSet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('rejects enrollment when same-owner saved material changes during the prompt', async () => {
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// Given valid enrollment input and a prompt-time swap of only the saved cash root
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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pluginMocks.authenticate.mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
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await saveWalletMaterial(ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL);
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});
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// When enrollment runs the biometric prompt
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const attempt = enableBiometricUnlock(MATERIAL);
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// Then the post-prompt commitment recheck fails and no biometric store is written
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('changed');
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expect(localStorage.getItem(WRAP_RECORD_KEY)).toBeNull();
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expect(pluginMocks.secureValues.has(SECURE_SECRET_KEY)).toBe(false);
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expect(pluginMocks.secureSet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('rejects an authenticated well-formed same-owner altered-root payload', async () => {
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// Given an authenticated wrap that claims the saved commitment but whose
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// decrypted material swaps only the cash root
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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await storeMaterialPayload(
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ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL,
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walletMaterialOwnerId(ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL),
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WRAP_SECRET,
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walletMaterialHash(MATERIAL),
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);
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const before = persistedState();
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// When biometric unlock decrypts the well-formed same-owner payload
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const attempt = unlockWalletMaterialWithBiometrics();
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// Then the material commitment rejects it and both stores stay byte-identical
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('wallet material');
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expect(persistedState()).toEqual(before);
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});
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it('rejects a wrap whose own commitment differs from the saved material before prompting', async () => {
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// Given an authenticated wrap committed to same-owner altered-root material
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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await storeMaterialPayload(ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL);
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const before = persistedState();
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// When biometric unlock inspects the record commitment
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const attempt = unlockWalletMaterialWithBiometrics();
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// Then it rejects before any prompt and both stores stay byte-identical
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('wallet material');
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expect(pluginMocks.authenticate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(persistedState()).toEqual(before);
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});
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it('rejects a stale wrap after same-owner saved material replacement', async () => {
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// Given an enrolled wrap and a later saved-material swap of only the cash root
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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await enableBiometricUnlock(MATERIAL);
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await saveWalletMaterial(ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL);
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const before = persistedState();
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// When the now-stale biometric wrap is used
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const attempt = unlockWalletMaterialWithBiometrics();
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// Then the stale commitment rejects and both stores stay byte-identical
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('wallet material');
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expect(persistedState()).toEqual(before);
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});
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it('rejects unlock when same-owner saved material changes during the prompt', async () => {
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// Given an enrolled wrap and a prompt-time swap of only the saved cash root
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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await enableBiometricUnlock(MATERIAL);
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let swapped: ReturnType<typeof persistedState> | null = null;
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pluginMocks.authenticate.mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
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await saveWalletMaterial(ALTERED_ROOT_MATERIAL);
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swapped = persistedState();
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});
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// When biometric unlock runs the prompt
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const attempt = unlockWalletMaterialWithBiometrics();
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// Then the post-prompt commitment recheck rejects and the ceremony writes nothing
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('changed');
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expect(swapped).not.toBeNull();
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expect(persistedState()).toEqual(swapped);
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});
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it('rejects unlock when the wrap record is replaced during the prompt', async () => {
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// Given an enrolled wrap replaced mid-prompt by another valid same-owner record
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await saveWalletMaterial(MATERIAL);
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await enableBiometricUnlock(MATERIAL);
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let swapped: ReturnType<typeof persistedState> | null = null;
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pluginMocks.authenticate.mockImplementationOnce(async () => {
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const secret = pluginMocks.secureValues.get(SECURE_SECRET_KEY);
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if (typeof secret !== 'string') throw new Error('expected an enrolled secure secret');
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await storeMaterialPayload(MATERIAL, walletMaterialOwnerId(MATERIAL), hexToBytes(secret));
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swapped = persistedState();
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});
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// When biometric unlock runs the prompt
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const attempt = unlockWalletMaterialWithBiometrics();
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// Then the record recheck rejects and the ceremony writes nothing itself
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await expect(attempt).rejects.toThrow('changed');
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expect(swapped).not.toBeNull();
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expect(persistedState()).toEqual(swapped);
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});
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});
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describe('biometric deletion ordering', () => {
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it('keeps native and local state retryable when secure-secret deletion fails', async () => {
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// Given a complete enrolled biometric wrap
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@@ -13,10 +13,13 @@
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// storage (Android Keystore-backed AES-GCM via
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// @aparajita/capacitor-secure-storage). The wrapped blob stays in
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// localStorage as a versioned AES-GCM record, plus the linking
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// pubkey as an identity check: restoring a DIFFERENT seed leaves a stale
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// wrap behind, and unlocking with it must fail loudly (never activate the
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// old wallet silently), so unlock verifies the unwrapped material owner against the
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// recorded pubkey and tells the holder to re-enroll.
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// pubkey as an identity check AND the SHA-256 commitment of the canonical
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// saved material: restoring a DIFFERENT seed leaves a stale wrap behind,
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// and so does replacing only the saved cash root with same-owner material.
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// Unlocking with either must fail loudly (never activate the old wallet
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// silently), so unlock verifies the record commitment and the unwrapped
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// material against the saved wallet material and tells the holder to
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// re-enroll.
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//
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// The biometric gate is app-level (a BiometricPrompt before the secure
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// read), not a keystore key invalidated on biometric re-enrollment - 04
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@@ -38,9 +41,12 @@ import { SecureStorage } from '@aparajita/capacitor-secure-storage';
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import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes, utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
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import {
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getPlainWalletMaterial,
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parseWalletMaterial,
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savedWalletMaterialHash,
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savedWalletMaterialOwnerId,
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serializeWalletMaterial,
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walletMaterialHash,
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walletMaterialLinkingKey,
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type WalletMaterialV2,
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} from '@/lnurlcash/keys';
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@@ -55,6 +61,7 @@ type BiometricWrapRecord = {
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readonly iv: string;
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readonly wrappedKey: string;
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readonly pubkey: string;
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readonly materialHash: string;
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readonly createdAt: number;
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};
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@@ -70,6 +77,7 @@ const WRAP_RECORD_KEYS = [
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'iv',
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'wrappedKey',
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'pubkey',
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'materialHash',
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'createdAt',
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] as const;
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@@ -110,6 +118,8 @@ const isValidWrapRecord = (record: unknown): record is BiometricWrapRecord => {
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/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(record.wrappedKey) &&
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typeof record.pubkey === 'string' &&
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/^[0-9a-f]{66}$/.test(record.pubkey) &&
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typeof record.materialHash === 'string' &&
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/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(record.materialHash) &&
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typeof record.createdAt === 'number' &&
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Number.isSafeInteger(record.createdAt) &&
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record.createdAt >= 0
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@@ -127,6 +137,18 @@ const readWrapRecord = (): BiometricWrapRecord | null => {
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}
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};
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const biometricWrapRecordsEqual = (
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left: BiometricWrapRecord,
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right: BiometricWrapRecord,
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): boolean =>
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left.version === right.version &&
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left.hkdfSalt === right.hkdfSalt &&
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left.iv === right.iv &&
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left.wrappedKey === right.wrappedKey &&
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left.pubkey === right.pubkey &&
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left.materialHash === right.materialHash &&
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left.createdAt === right.createdAt;
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// sync on purpose (same convention as hasPasskeySlots): the unlock form and
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// the security page ask this during render/setup
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export const isBiometricUnlockEnrolled = (): boolean => readWrapRecord() !== null;
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@@ -179,12 +201,27 @@ export const enableBiometricUnlock = async (
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if (savedWalletMaterialOwnerId() !== ownerId) {
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throw new Error('Biometric enrollment requires the proven saved wallet owner.');
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}
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// exact-material commitment (same check as passkey slots): the enrolled
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// bytes must equal the canonical saved material, not just share its owner
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const materialHash = savedWalletMaterialHash();
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const plaintext = getPlainWalletMaterial();
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if (
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materialHash === null ||
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walletMaterialHash(canonicalMaterial) !== materialHash ||
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(plaintext !== null && serializeWalletMaterial(plaintext) !== serialized)
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) {
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throw new Error('Biometric enrollment requires the exact saved wallet material.');
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}
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const biometry = await BiometricAuth.checkBiometry();
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if (!biometry.isAvailable) {
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throw new Error(biometry.reason || 'No biometric unlock is set up on this device.');
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}
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// prove presence before storing anything under the biometric gate
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await authenticateOrThrow('Set up biometric unlock for your wallet');
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// the prompt yields time: re-verify the commitment before writing anything
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if (savedWalletMaterialOwnerId() !== ownerId || savedWalletMaterialHash() !== materialHash) {
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throw new Error('Saved wallet material changed during biometric enrollment.');
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}
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const secret = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));
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const hkdfSalt = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
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const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
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@@ -205,6 +242,7 @@ export const enableBiometricUnlock = async (
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iv: bytesToHex(iv),
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wrappedKey: bytesToHex(ciphertext),
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pubkey: ownerId,
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materialHash,
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createdAt: Date.now(),
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};
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localStorage.setItem(WRAP_RECORD_STORAGE_KEY, JSON.stringify(record));
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@@ -221,7 +259,24 @@ export const unlockWalletMaterialWithBiometrics = async (): Promise<WalletMateri
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'Biometric unlock belongs to a different wallet - set it up again in Settings > Security.',
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);
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}
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// the stored commitment must match the canonical saved material, or the
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// wrap is stale (same-owner cash-root replacement) and must not unlock
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const materialHash = savedWalletMaterialHash();
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if (materialHash === null || record.materialHash !== materialHash) {
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throw new Error(
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'Biometric unlock belongs to different wallet material - set it up again in Settings > Security.',
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);
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}
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await authenticateOrThrow('Unlock your sattle wallet');
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// the prompt yields time: re-read the record and the saved commitment
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// before any decrypted plaintext can reach the caller
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const currentRecord = readWrapRecord();
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if (currentRecord === null || !biometricWrapRecordsEqual(record, currentRecord)) {
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throw new Error('The biometric wrap changed during the unlock ceremony.');
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}
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if (savedWalletMaterialOwnerId() !== ownerId || savedWalletMaterialHash() !== materialHash) {
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throw new Error('Saved wallet material changed during the unlock ceremony.');
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}
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const secretHex = await SecureStorage.get(SECURE_SECRET_KEY);
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if (typeof secretHex !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(secretHex)) {
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throw new Error('Biometric unlock data is missing - set it up again in Settings > Security.');
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@@ -242,6 +297,12 @@ export const unlockWalletMaterialWithBiometrics = async (): Promise<WalletMateri
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'Biometric unlock belongs to a different wallet - set it up again in Settings > Security.',
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);
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}
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// the decrypted material itself must carry the committed cash root
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if (savedWalletMaterialHash() !== materialHash || walletMaterialHash(material) !== materialHash) {
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throw new Error(
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'Biometric unlock belongs to different wallet material - set it up again in Settings > Security.',
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);
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}
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return material;
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};
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